One of the major contributions of Henri de Lubac to contemporary theology is his reflection on the senses of Holy Scripture. Started in Catholicisme , his reflection on this subject reached its full development in Exégèse médiévale. Les quatre sens de l'Ecriture , and was taken up again by way of a synthesis in L'Ecriture dans la Tradition . His book on Origen expresses well the central idea: God reveals himself in history, but these historical events are to be understood (...) spiritually. (shrink)

There is no general agreement among scholars that Aristotle had a unified concept of phantasia. That is evident from the most cursory glance through the literature. Freudenthal speaks of the contradictions into which Aristotle seems to fall in his remarks about phantasia, and explains the contradictions as due to the border position which phantasia occupies between Wahrnehmung and thinking. Ross, in Aristotle, p. 143, talks of passages on phantasia in De Anima 3. 3 which constitute ‘a reversal of his doctrine (...) of sensation’ and perhaps do not ‘represent his deliberate view’. This is a serious state of affairs, since De Anima 3. 3 is Aristotle’s main discussion of phantasia. Of passages on phantasia, appearances and images in De Anima 3. 3, Hamlyn says: ‘There is clearly little consistency here’. Even Schofield, who is more optimistic about saving the unity of Aristotle’s concept than the last two scholars, grants that ‘some of the inconsistencies of Aristotle’s account seem more than merely apparent’.1 He thinks of Aristotle’s phantasia as a ‘loose-knit, family concept’. My purpose here is to suggest that Aristotle is more consistent in his use of phantasia than his critics will allow him to be. The translation of the term as imagination frequently adds unnecessarily to the confusion, so I shall avoid it and use transliteration instead. (shrink)

Esta obra visa mostrar os conflitos sobre a língua nacional causados pelo funcionamento político do simbólico, durante o governo de JK - anos 50 do século XX.

En este artículo argumento que el empleo de tecnologías biomédicas para la mejora moral es inadecuado para evitar riesgos globales, debido a que puede provocar problemas similares a los que se pretenden resolver por medio de su uso. Por este motivo, defiendo la conveniencia de explorar otras tecnologías para la mejora moral que no supongan tantos peligros y argumento en favor de un modelo de mejora moral por medio de la inteligencia artificial. En concreto, defiendo el empleo de SocrAI, un (...) asistente moral artificial diseñado para mejorar nuestra deliberación moral. Para ello, propongo tres criterios que permitan evaluar y aumentar su seguridad y eficacia. Asimismo, señalo la importancia de tener en cuenta las cuestiones estructurales e institucionales —i. e., las normas o los incentivos políticos, económicos, sociales y culturales— en las propuestas de mejora moral, y muestro cómo SocrAI puede tener impacto en ellas. (shrink)

Conservation biology has embraced the development and application of artificial intelligence to optimize its work. The efficiency with which machine learning processes data helps to identify wild species, repair anthropogenic impacts, and intervene in ecosystems, offering supposedly good results for conservation. Thus, artificial intelligence can here be proposed as an ally of environmental justice. However, I will dispute this thesis, arguing that since conservation biology does not start from absolute parameters and environmental justice is not free from moral plurality, then (...) artificial intelligence could reproduce and increase epistemological and ethical biases. La biología de la conservación se ha sumado al uso de la inteligencia artificial para optimizar su trabajo. La eficiencia con que esta procesa los datos ayuda a identificar especies salvajes, reparar los impactos antropogénicos e intervenir en ecosistemas, ofreciendo resultados supuestamente buenos para la conservación. Así, la inteligencia artificial puede proponerse como una aliada de la justicia ambiental. Pero discutiré esta tesis, argumentando que como la biología de la conservación no parte de parámetros absolutos y la justicia ambiental no está exenta de una pluralidad moral, entonces la inteligencia artificial puede reproducir y aumentar los sesgos epistemológicos y éticos. (shrink)